On Freedom
XIII. On Freedom
1. God is free in His existence
and free in His operation,
by reason of <the> possifier, <the> possificable <and> possifying.[1]
2. God possesses free power in His great goodness,
<which goodness consists in the> bonifier, bonifying and <the> bonified,
and likewise as regards <His> infinity and eternity.
3. God is freer in terms of His power
than is man in terms of his will:
who, then, might gain wisdom into His freedom?[2]
4. God is free as regards infinitising,
eternifying and perfecting:
nothing is capable of contradicting God.
5. Freedom is superior in terms of will,
memory and knowledge
than it is in terms of a kingdom or possessions.[3]
6. God created man free with respect to virtue,
but man has become enslaved
because he has shown ingratitude <towards Him>.
7. Everyone can enjoy freedom
by loving and cherishing God,
because God forces the will of no one.
8. A man who is enslaved to sin
lacks freedom of will,
because justice has imprisoned it.
9. Man is not enslaved by virtue,
nor is the man free who has succumbed to sin
until he acknowledges that he has done so.
10. Tormented enslavement,
provided that it is well-deserved,
is of greater utility than is honourable freedom.
[1] Cf. n. 3, Ch. IX, § 3.
[2] Cf. n. 4, Ch. IX, § 4.
[3] Memory, intellect/understanding and will/love are the three Augustinian powers of the rational soul. Formalised or otherwise, they provide the central investigative components of the Lullian Arts.